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ABSTRACT 
This article argues that the vision of a social law of contract is 
exhibited in the judgment of the Swiss Federal Court in Post v. Verein 
gegen Tierfabriken (“VgT”). The judgment is one of a law of contract that 
interacts with a community of the subjects instead of the individual subjects 
of a community.  This paper contends that law today has the task of 
providing for the areas of social autonomy from which “civil society” is 
built up and in which, at the same time, the increasing social fragmentation 
can be overcome piecemeal. The article argues that conceiving contract 
law as civil society constitutionalism, as the constitution not of the state but 
of society, is the jurisprudential task for our time. 
I.  FROM SUBJECT TO SOCIETY 
The starting point of our considerations is the judgment of the Swiss 
Federal Court in Post v. Verein gegen Tierfabriken (―VgT‖).1 For behind 
this judgment, a powerful vision shines through: the vision of a social law 
of contract. This vision does not conform with Gierke‘s sense of a private 
law lubricated with ―social oil,‖2 [p. 236] the communitarian sense of 
MacNeil,
3
 or the post-class struggle sense of the Study Group on Social 
Justice in European Private Law.
4
 The picture appearing behind the 
judgment is instead one of a law of contract that interacts with society as 
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such and not just with individuals (for example, the rich versus the poor, the 
strong versus the weak, or the independent versus the dependent), who 
always embody only a part of society. This law is social in the original 
meaning of the word: it abandons its bias in favor of the subjects of a 
community and takes sides with a community of the subjects. 
This proposition is not to be seen as a mere play on words. It points out 
that today‘s law of contract can no longer, in liberal fashion, content itself 
with enabling and facilitating legal transactions. Contract law today has the 
further task of providing for the areas of social autonomy from which ―civil 
society‖ is built up and in which, at the same time, the increasing social 
fragmentation can be overcome piecemeal. Conceiving contract law as civil 
society constitutionalism, as the constitution not of the state but of society, 
is the jurisprudential task for our time. In Post v. VgT the Federal Court has, 
in the outcome at any rate, begun to do this job. It has sought to develop 
first elements for this sort of understanding of contract law, something that 
has so far—wrongly, we feel—– brought it almost exclusively censure and 
criticism.
5
 
A.  Individual Dispute Versus Conflict of Discourses 
What was it about? The story is simple on the surface: in late 1999 the 
VgT (―Association against Animal Factories‖) gave the Post two of its 
quarterly publica- [p. 237] tions, printed in a total of 700,000 copies, 
unaddressed for mass mailing to German- and French-speaking Swiss 
households. The Post refused the mailing. It explained its refusal on the 
ground that the publications would damage its reputation and hamper its 
business, since they criticized various farmers, who might feel compelled 
because of the mailing to question their business relations with the Post. 
According to the facts of the case taken by the court as the basis for its 
judgment, there were no alternatives open to VgT.
6
 That is, other firms that 
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could have distributed the magazines as efficiently as the Post were not 
(yet) available in 1999. 
The nature of the conflict reflected in these facts is the really interesting 
(and difficult) thing about the case because this conflict takes place between 
parties that do not move in the same societal sphere. The Post primarily 
operates in the economy, whereas the VgT is active in media and politics. 
Camprubi identifies this difference as a ―dilemma underlying the decision‖ 
and states that ―[t]he Post, undoubtedly to be termed—as the Federal Court 
does in the present case—an enterprise with a strong [economic] power 
position, turned down a potential customer [VgT], with the effect that the 
latter was de facto restricted in the propagation of its political opinions.‖7 
What does not emerge from these certainly accurate observations is the fact 
that, over and above the subjective dispute, a conflict of discourses, as 
described by Lyotard, is present, i.e., a clash of different social rationalities, 
namely one between economic and political discourse.
8
 This is the key to 
understanding Post v. VgT. For the discursive dimension of this clash, going 
beyond the mere subjective dispute between Post and VgT, shows that the 
issues that the judgment seeks to tackle lie in the choice of criteria for 
settling a dispute between two realms of society that cannot be reduced to a 
common denominator (for example, money, political power, or protection 
of animal life). If, however, neither economic, political, nor ecological 
criteria can do justice to this clash, can there be some other reference (of a 
new type), which in casu may reconcile the conflict in a socially acceptable 
manner? What might this third perspective actually be? 
B.  The New Private-law Society 
The Federal Court‘s considerations in the Post v. VgT judgment are 
built on a plan that seems to stick to the traditional hierarchy of the legal 
system. Thus, the court first verified whether postal legislation provides in 
casu for a duty to deliver. [p. 238] It first recalls that, since the postal 
legislation reform of January 1, 1998,
9
 the Post has been organizationally 
independent of the federal administration and is a public-law entity with its 
own legal personality. Subsequently, the Federal Court asks whether the 
Post as a legal person operating under private law in a context of 
competitive services infringed, by its refusal to distribute the VgT 
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publications, on ―media freedom, specifically freedom of the press.‖10 The 
lower court had answered in the affirmative on the ground that the Post, as a 
public-law entity, was bound to preserve the constitutional rights, 
irrespective of the legal form under which it was operating. The Federal 
Court decided otherwise, reasoning that since the Post was not acting as a 
―state actor‖ in the area of competitive services, the constitutional rights on 
the basis of the Swiss Federal Constitution (Cst.) art. 35(2) did not come 
into consideration.
11
 Nor could any such requirement follow from Cst. art. 
35(1), since the legislator had clearly wanted the Post to be on the same 
footing in the area of competitive services as its private competitors.
12
 
An interim observation on this point: the Federal Court‘s considerations 
on ―state action‖ referred to above, like the exposition of administrative law 
in Post v. VgT, ought not to be read from the viewpoint of the traditional 
dichotomy between state and society. This has been implicitly denied by 
Hangartner. In a critical assessment of the judgment, he notes that ―state 
action‖ within the meaning of Cst. art. 35(2) refers to ―any State activity or 
[any activity] attributable to the State.‖13 Correspondingly, the Post in 
casu—contrary to the Federal Court‘s view—was bound by the 
constitutional provisions, and the refusal to distribute the VgT publications 
did infringe media freedom. This position may be defensible according to 
classical constitutional rights doctrine, but fails to see that the constitutional 
rights question discussed in Post v. VgT arises in a context of privatization. 
Ultimately, privatization means a fundamental reorganization of various 
social functions. Such context radically changes the premises of traditional 
constitutional rights theory. 
C.  A Question of Perspective 
After declining to consider the Post a state actor, the Federal Court 
deliberates about the possibility of the horizontal effect of constitutional 
rights (Drittwirkung) [p. 239]  under Cst. art. 35(3). This is, however, set 
aside uninvestigated, ―because it . . . will follow from purely private-law 
considerations that the Post was not entitled . . . to refuse the distribution of 
[the VgT publications].‖14 This sentence has to be seen as the pivot of the 
judgment: what is ultimately being announced here is nothing less than an 
attempt at structural adaptation of the legal system—in particular the 
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threadbare private-public law dichotomy—to the reorganization of societal 
functions brought by the privatization wave in the 1990s. This endeavor 
amounts to a program of Herculean dimensions. That such a program 
cannot be set on foot through a single supreme court decision is manifest. 
Accordingly, Post v. VgT remains an outline for the moment, and while it 
does point in a certain direction, its reasoning still needs to be further 
thought through in many respects. However, we shall go into that later. 
First, we must look at the Federal Court‘s private-law solution to the case. 
The first sentence in ground six makes clear what the point is: ―A 
distribution obligation on the Post, which in the area of competitive 
services—like its private competitors—acts within the forms of private law, 
exists where an obligation to contract [p. 240] is to be presumed.‖15 Since in 
the case at hand no precontractual or framework obligation to perform 
exists, the Federal Court looks for a statutory basis, but finds no provision 
explicitly calling for an obligation to contract, and accordingly asks 
―whether such [an obligation] . . . may also follow from . . . general 
principles of private law.‖16 After considering the seminal Seelig decision17 
and taking an excursus through the scholarship, the Federal Court answers 
in the affirmative. It stresses that contractual freedom ―has, as an element of 
private autonomy, an extremely high place in the private-law system.‖18 
Accordingly, restrictions on the freedom to conclude contracts have a 
―markedly exceptional character.‖ The prohibition of immoral conduct can 
be used to derive an obligation to contract only under the following 
cumulative conditions: 
An obligation to contract on this basis presupposes, first, 
that an undertaking offer its goods or services generally 
and publicly. . . . Second, the obligation to contract can 
relate only to goods and services satisfying ordinary needs. 
. . . Third, an obligation to contract can be assumed only 
where the interested party lacks, because of the supplier’s 
strong power position, acceptable alternatives for meeting 
his ordinary need. . . . Fourth, an obligation to contract can 
be assumed only where the undertaking can give no 
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objectively justified reasons for refusing to conclude the 
contract.
19
 
In the case in point, the Federal Court finds these requirements to be 
met, and concludes, as a judicial determination, from this finding that 
―[u]nder these circumstances the Post‘s refusal to carry the plaintiff‘s 
[VgT‘s] publications is contra bonos mores. The Post would accordingly 
have been under obligation to carry the plaintiff‘s consignments on the 
terms it had . . . publicly and generally announced.‖20 
Legal scholars raised a storm against this part of the judgment,, 
claiming, for example, that the judgment overshot the target,
21
 contradicted 
elementary logic,
22
 departed from the history of civil law,
23
 constituted 
normative exaggeration of mere mores,
24
 and raised methodical 
objections.
25
 These harsh words indicate that the discussion around Post v. 
VgT was no longer just about mere differences of legal scholarship. If, 
however, legal scholarship no longer helps, how can the judgment‘s 
meaning be further unpacked? 
 
II.  POLYCONTEXTURALIZATION OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
To elucidate the significance of Post v. VgT, and especially the 
emergent structures of a law of contract to be understood, in the sense 
described, as ―social,‖ we wish to use the tools of Law & Society 
scholarship.
26
 By contrast with legal doctrine, which concentrates on the 
constructability of a solution within the set of legal rules in force, Law & 
Society scholars consider the legal system from the [p. 241] outside.
27
 The 
gain this offers is a description of the means whereby the law interacts with 
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society at large. This, however, first calls for a look at the particularities of 
today‘s society. 
A.  Günther’s “Mehrwertige Logik” 
It is possible to see the Federal Court‘s search for new forms of social 
reciprocity through the law of contract as a reaction to privatization.
28
 It 
remains undisputed that the phenomenon of privatization brings with it a 
creeping de-solidarization of society. This calls for a functional equivalent 
to public law, the grip of which disappears in the privatized sector and 
which can now hardly, if at all, guarantee social peace. Were we to stop at 
this stage of the analysis, we would be overlooking the fact that a more 
fundamental problem lies behind Post v. VgT—the problem of the 
polycontexturalization of society. For the phenomenon of privatization is 
ultimately—with all the reservations that such a statement requires—a 
response to the fragmentation of society into increasingly numerous 
autonomous sectors, of which the coordination and administration by a 
central body, namely the state, is gradually becoming implausible. Against 
this background we must consider what is the specific feature of the 
polycontextural society to which Post v. TgV seems to be trying to adapt the 
law of contract. 
A description of the polycontextural society should start from the 
“mehrwertige Logik”  developed by Günther, which notably continues and 
expands on the findings of Hegel.
29
 Günther is chiefly concerned with 
replacing the current monocontextuality with a new logic that fits in with 
so-called transmodern science. In contrast with a classical binary logic (e.g., 
subject/object or paradise/hell), held together—in monocontextual 
fashion—by something all-embracing, that is, an Absolute such as the 
world-spirit or an all-powerful god, Günther‘s logic takes on a multiplicity 
of values. These values in turn set up new binary logics or contextures, 
making the universe appear to be polycontextural.
30
 In social contexts, [p. 
242]  these binary contextures combine to create interlinked contextures 
displaying far higher complexity.
31
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The structure of today‘s society can be described from Günther‘s 
viewpoint as a differentiated one insofar as variously specialized areas of 
action have developed out of combinations of individual contextures that 
follow a common ―context-rationality.‖ This sort of simultaneous 
coexistence of various operationally autonomous logics of action, which, 
however, relate to and interact with each other, gives rise to a society of 
great structural complexity; from Günther‘s viewpoint, it should be stressed 
that society, understood as interlinked contextures, differs decisively from 
its individual parts. Very roughly, economic rationality follows profit as the 
leading difference (valuable / worthless), politics relates to the rationality of 
power (powerful / powerless), while science is interested primarily in the 
search for truth (true / false) and art in the beautiful (aesthetic / 
unaesthetic).
32
 Every communication happens simultaneously in various 
contexts. Any communication, say about new unemployment figures, is 
thus simultaneously specifically economic, legal, and political 
communication. 
B.  The Conceptual Readiness of the Law of Contract 
What does all this have to do with the law of contract? The foregoing 
statements suggest that in Post v. VgT the court attempted to orient the law 
of contract to the polycontexturality of society in the sense of securing the 
wealth of contexts against tendencies of whatever kind to overwhelm 
them.
33
 Put more concretely, the judgment seems to have employed the 
figure of an obligation to contract as a tool to prevent the economy from 
blocking political discourse. This raises the question of whether the law of 
contract really has the capacity to perform such a function. Or does it at first 
sight lack the conceptual readiness to serve this type of polycontextural 
constitutionalization function?  
[p. 243]  From a historical perspective, nothing argues essentially 
against this conceptual readiness of the law of contract; right from the 
beginnings of market society, contract law has played a key role in 
constituting economic autonomies and making them compatible with other 
social contexts. In nineteenth century society, the need was to ensure the 
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necessary basis of trust in contractual relations between individuals and to 
protect the individual from being deprived of contractual freedom, thereby 
legally enabling and pushing forward the differentiation of the economic 
system. In the twentieth century, the de facto freedom of action of broad 
strata of the population was achieved, thereby making the differentiated 
economy compatible with other social areas through political concepts.
34
 
After Post v. VgT, it is now more strongly the constitution of the intrinsic 
rationality of the various areas of social autonomy that are central to the 
task of the law of contract, not least as a response to the policy of 
privatization. 
III.  CIVIL CONSTITUTION I:                                                                    
INTEGRATION OF THE POLYCONTEXTURAL SOCIETY 
If, against the background of the foregoing explanations, the thesis that 
the law of contract ought to be considered further as a civil constitution has 
gained a certain plausibility, then the point now is how this new task is to 
be fleshed out in detail. What has Post v. VgT to teach us in this respect? 
Can this fleshing-out in case law act as a basis for constitutionalizing the 
multiple, continually self-renewing contexts of society? 
Before addressing these questions, we should clarify what is meant by 
the term ―civil constitution.‖ Why do we speak here of ―constitution,‖ when 
what is at issue in Post v. VgT is, in substantive law terms, classical 
(bipolar) contract law? In other words, for what reason is a civil 
constitution, in addition to the traditional state constitution, required in the 
polycontextural society? Once this preliminary question is answered, we 
will discuss the question of what social forces are used in Post v. VgT in 
order to integrate society through the use of private law. 
 
[p. 244]   
A.  Constitution “From Below” 
The most advanced ideas about the concept of a civil constitution today 
come from those scholars who deal with the globalization of law. Their 
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thoughts focus on the idea of a societal constitutionalism,
35
 or of a 
―constitutionalisation without the state.‖36 At the center of this idea is the 
notion that the constitution of transnational communities (for instance, the 
transnational economy, international sport, and the Internet) comes not from 
above but from below.  
Grotius‘ famous proposition ubi societas ibi ius has to be 
reformulated in the conditions of the functional 
differentiation of the planet in such a way that, wherever 
autonomous social sectors develop, autonomous law is 
simultaneously produced, at a relative distance from 
politics. Law-making also takes place outside the classical 
sources of international law, in agreements between global 
players, in private market regulation by multi-national 
concerns, internal regulations of international 
organisations, inter-organisational negotiating systems, 
world-wide standardisation processes that come about 
partly in markets, and partly in processes of negotiation 
among organisations. … If it is true that the dominant 
sources of global law are now to be found at the peripheries 
of law, at the boundaries with other sectors of world 
society, and no longer in the existing centres of law-making 
— national parliaments, global legislative institutions and 
inter-governmental agreements — then, this simultaneously 
also means that norms of constitutional quality are always 
being produced there.
37
 
Plainly, everything then depends on the possibility of defining criteria that 
identify the ―norms of constitutional quality.‖ The discussion now gets 
caught in the maelstrom of innumerable concepts of constitution offered in 
the literature.
38
 [p. 245]  Today, there seems to be some consensus that, 
conceptually, one should talk about a constitution only if norms have 
emerged that (1) limit and guide into ordered pathways the capacity of the 
                                                 
 35. Cf. DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-
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legal system and society to influence each other (criterion of 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit), (2) define the ways of producing law in H.L.A. Hart‘s 
sense of setting up secondary norms and stopping ―arbitrary‖ normativity 
(criterion of positivization of law),
39
 and (3) lay down the constitutional 
rights standards that every legal communication must meet (criterion of 
self-regulation of law).
40
 This self-regulation is not confined to formal laws, 
but also extends to general terms of trade, private standards, and the like; 
the aim is the legal liberation, but, at the same time, the curbing, of system-
specific rationality vis-à-vis internal spontaneous order and other sectors of 
society.
41
 
B.  Constitution as “Integrative Reality” 
Post v. VgT is concerned not with the civil constitution of sectors of 
world society that have differentiated in the wake of globalization, but with 
something else: the consequences that the polycontexturalization of society 
has for existing law—that is, the question of how the legal system must, in 
consequence of the many shifts due to society‘s polycontexturalization, be 
internally reorganized.
42
 A polycontextural society, as we describe it above, 
is, inter alia, distinguished by the absence of any body able to take on 
responsibility for the whole.  
There is [for instance] no subsystem for the ecology, and 
even were such a subsystem to form, it would be in 
competition with other subsystems and would first have to 
assert its claim to recognition. This problem might be 
termed the ‗Tower-of-Babel syndrome‘. . . . [p. 246]   
[Social integration] . . . might fail because of the 
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multiplicity of codes and the poor communication between 
subsystems.
43
 
The question then is what can still hold a polycontextural society 
together. If this type of society is distinguished by the fact that its 
subsystems each have their own rationalities, making mutual understanding 
difficult, or even impossible, while at the same time coordination ―from 
above,‖ by some central body such as the parliament or government, 
appears unrealistic, then one thing should be clear: the hierarchical concept 
of constitution suited to the nation state, which is supposed to 
constitutionalize not just the state but the whole society, can no longer stand 
up. What ways out are there, then, in this situation? 
It is here that we should draw inspiration from the discussion on 
―constitutionalisation without the state,‖ even though in relation to the 
issues we are dealing with, it cannot be adopted as-is. It is not confined to 
outlining the concept of constitution, but also raises the question of what the 
constitution of a fragmented society actually ought to achieve. Yet, of some 
importance is Teubner‘s statement that the ―constitution of world society . . 
. [cannot] take place in a unitary global constitution which overlies all areas 
of society, but, instead, emerges incrementally in the constitutionalisation 
of a multiplicity of autonomous sub-systems of world society.‖44 It is just 
this notion of incremental constitutionalization of autonomous social 
discourses that we need to use to illuminate and extend the project 
embarked on in Post v. VgT. 
In this connection we would recall that in polycontextural society the 
civil society ―zones‖ are not directly visible to politics and still less 
deliberately influenceable by it. Politics, the traditional constitutional 
lawmaker, lacks the knowledge and the means to grasp and guide the 
evolutionary processes of civil society, which are increasingly radicalized in 
their dynamics. Accordingly, civil society is struggling today, more than 
ever—as it were for structural reasons—against being constitutionalized on 
the pattern of the state constitution. This pattern is of course still open in 
content, but nonetheless sets goals and, to that extent, starts from a 
teleological picture of the social order.
45
 It thus prescribes an order that 
moves within a clear range of variation laid down by politics. In the 
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evolutionary [p. 247] process of civil society, by contrast, there is hardly 
ever an even halfway stable boundary drawn between social sectors, nor are 
their respective functions ever durably fixed. The range of variation is 
unlimited from the viewpoint of politics. Thus, prescribed goals based on a 
teleological social model inevitably miss the intended effect. 
Polycontextural society continually reconfigures itself, living from 
discourses that emerge and disappear again, replace each other, and during 
their existence continually change their concrete form.
46
 
That is precisely why, in its non-political areas, civil society needs a 
constitution that follows a different logic from that of classical state 
constitutionalism, which, while institutionally confined to the political 
processes, has the ambition to constitutionalize the whole of society in this 
way.
47
 This logic is different because it is to be conceived incrementally, 
i.e., it functions dynamically, organically, and in context-related fashion. 
Essentially, this means the need is not to lay down some preset order 
planned on fixed parameters, but to find an ―external constitution,‖48 or a 
―géométrie variable.‖49 Synchronization between social discourses cannot 
come about through rational calculation but only in pragmatic fashion. Due 
to ever changing circumstances such a synchronization is only ever valid in 
relation to a particular point in time. It cannot therefore be durable and must 
continually be redone. The principle of an incremental constitution of 
autonomous social systems lies from this viewpoint not in creating an order 
fleshed out in substantive law, but in making available supporting 
instruments enabling these systems to create from their own resources their 
(respective) order, that is, their civil constitution. Correspondingly, the 
function of this sort of civil constitution can be described entirely in the 
categories of Smend‘s integrationist concept of constitution, which 
describes an integration process that, while definitely not aiming at 
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―continually recreating the living totality of [p. 248] the State,‖50 
nevertheless integrates—in parallel with the state constitution—anew the 
various social discourses. In short, Smend suggests that civil constitution is 
―integrative reality‖51—a description that is appropriate particularly because 
the term ―reality‖ brings with it a connotation of fluctuation, as reality never 
stands still. 
C.  Extension of the Area of Dispute in Contract Law  
One might also delineate the problem from the viewpoint of the debate 
on privatization (always bearing in mind that privatization stands, under 
certain circumstances, in direct connection with social 
polycontexturalization).
52
 It would then be seen that those social areas 
dismissed into the private sphere have by no means thereby lost their need 
for constitutionalization. They continue to need integration into the social 
whole, i.e., the definition of their relations with each other and with the 
whole of society. 
Public law will, for the reasons just mentioned above, be able to offer 
little support for this integration.
53
 It relates its concerns solely to the state, 
and has lost its relevance for the formerly public, now private, functions of 
these sectors. One might consider filling this gap by expanding public law 
and its principles so that this complex of norms would also cover the 
privatized areas. This is the key idea of the theory that postulates that 
private actors are always bound by constitutional rights whenever their 
action still contain remnants of a former public task (state action doctrine).
54
 
Post v. VgT is in contradiction with this doctrine as the message of the 
judgment is that the integration of the non-state sectors of society cannot 
possibly be secured through a closed system on the pattern of traditional 
public law, but only ―by liberating evolutionary processes of self-regulation 
and system-building.‖55 The judgment recognized that there was no 
prospect of stopping the game of permanent differentiation of society, as 
the traditional constitutional legislator once sought to do. On our reading, 
the message to be decoded from Post v. VgT is that there is only one way 
forward: to seek means to enable the conflicting [p. 249] social autonomies 
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lastingly to restore ―practical concordance‖ themselves whenever 
necessary.
56
 
This is perhaps the most far-sighted aspect of Post v. VgT. Instead of 
somehow applying public law to privatized sectors where it does not fit, this 
judgment mobilizes the historically developed constitutionalization function 
of the law of contract. To be sure, this function has hitherto been confined 
to a very specific, purely economic constitutionalization objective, which 
we may sum up in the phrase ―market constitutionalization.‖57 The job to be 
done in Post v. VgT was, accordingly, to make these civil-constitution 
elements, embodied in the general contract law of obligations, fruitful for 
the polycontextural society as a whole. But can these elements be detached 
from their economic reference and be extended to other social systems? 
This question raises the problem of how the civil constitutional function 
of the law of contract can be reflected in terms of legal technique. Basically, 
in legal scholarship and legal theory, two approaches have been developed 
that might aid this discussion: (1) the theory of the horizontal effect of 
constitutional rights, and (2) the concept of discursive rights proposed by 
Teubner and Graber. 
IV. CIVIL CONSTITUTION II: FLESHING OUT THE INTEGRATIVE FUNCTION 
OF CONTRACT LAW  
A.  Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights 
In Post v. VgT, the Federal Court, as we have described,
58
 felt it 
―needless‖ to employ the doctrine of the horizontal effect of constitutional 
rights. What lies behind this choice? Is its application determined solely by 
the circumstances of the individual case or should more be seen in it? It 
would be quite conceivable that the highest court wanted, for purely 
practical reasons, to avoid the dangerous reefs of a scarcely controllable 
conflict of constitutional rights. For in Post v. VgT economic freedom and 
media freedom clashed ―frontally,‖ both mutually incompatible, and, 
therefore, each struggling for exclusive application.
59
 To seek to me- [p. 
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250] diate in this situation between two constitutional rights would have 
triggered the limits of what could still be justified. The Federal Court would 
thereby have ended up striking a ―trade off‖ that is as common as it is 
vacuous.
60
 ―Trade off,‖ as a legal method, seeks to determine the 
circumstances of the individual case precisely, so as to justify priority in 
concreto for the one or the other constitutional rights position. But that is 
illusory. A conflict of two incompatible constitutional rights cannot be 
solved by calculating, from a juridical evaluation of the legal facts, the 
―right‖ solution.61 Even if the solution then presented bears the appearance 
of argumentative rationality, it is, and remains, the outcome of a vague ―gut 
feeling‖ and amounts to either politics disguised in legal form or 
methodological arbitrariness.  
Besides this fairly practical explanation, there are probably also deeper 
reasons for the Federal Court‘s reluctance in the case at hand to opt for a 
solution based on the horizontal effect of constitutional rights. The 
problematic aspect of the theory of horizontal effect of constitutional rights 
is more the transfer of the political constitution to civil society. Liberal 
constitutional rights theory is correct in this point—the constitutional rights, 
as institutionalized in the political constitution, are in fact to be seen as 
political rights, won by citizens in long struggles against the state.
62
 This 
speaks against applying them directly to private persons, as the theory of 
the horizontal effect of constitutional rights postulates. Relations between 
private persons obey a different logic from that governing relations between 
citizens and the state. A direct transfer of the political values inherent in the 
constitutional rights to non-state areas would not only contribute to a 
colonization of these areas by politics, but would scarcely be capable of 
opposing the dangers to autonomy arising from the intrinsic dynamics of 
the respective non-state area.  
To summarize, in the polycontextural society, the theories of the 
horizontal effect of constitutional rights cannot provide any real help 
because they remain stuck with the notion that either the judge (theory of 
direct horizontal effect) or the legislature (theory of the constitutional duty 
of the state to protect the private [p. 251] sphere) can determine the correct 
outcome in applying constitutional rights to private-law relations through 
recourse to a sovereign-planned order built into these institutions. The 
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private actors are by contrast reduced to objects of state or of judicial 
protective policy. The constitutionalization of private-law relations is, 
however, brought about by a corresponding instrumentalization of law from 
above and with no reference to the knowledge accumulated through the 
self-organization processes in non-state areas, or to the expectations 
developed in these knowledge-building processes.
63
 In the conditions of an 
innovation-oriented, knowledge-based society, the existence of which 
depends primarily on the achievements of the private sector, as well as on 
radical shifts in the performance of social functions (especially in the 
privatization debate), even these newer approaches to an indirect effect of 
constitutional rights prove to be inadequate attempts at creating a normative 
structure for guaranteeing areas of social autonomy. 
B. Theory of Discursive Rights 
What, finally, are the chances for Teubner‘s and Graber‘s theory of 
discursive rights to grasp the basic idea of Post v. VgT and, thus, put the 
integrative function of private law into words? Generally speaking, these 
authors seek to extend Luhmann‘s system-theory treatment of constitutional 
rights into a generalized approach to dealing with intersystem conflicts. 
They aim at developing impersonal discursive rights that protect one social 
discourse (e.g., art) in danger of being overwhelmed, i.e., having its 
rationality affected, by another (e.g., the economy).
64
 Such an effect on one 
social system‘s rationality occurs, in the example of art versus economy, if, 
for instance, broadcasters interrupt transmissions of films with commercial 
advertising breaks, thus hampering the arousal of artistically appropriate 
impressions in the viewer. In this specific case, discursive rights would 
work as follows: ―The moral right of the author [is] re-interpreted as a 
constitutional right which protects the integrity of artistic communication 
against infringements not by the State, but by an economic enterprise.‖65 
[p. 252] This approach does not aim at the replacement of constitutional 
rights as guarantees of individual autonomy. Instead, this system is to be 
supplemented—that is, it must be recognized that the sphere of the self-
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realizing individual is only one of the many areas of freedom that are 
secured by constitutional rights.
66
 To that extent, it is only consistent for the 
theory of discursive rights to take off from private law as the main arsenal 
of legal institutions serving individual possibilities of development in our 
society.  
[C]onstitutional rights understood as discourse rights can 
be seen as cornerstones for a reconstruction of private law. 
Contemporary private law must see one of its main tasks in 
the protection of the many private autonomies, not only 
against the repressive state but also against the expansionist 
tendencies of technology, science and the market.
67
  
Thus, Teubner‘s strategy is focused primarily on doing away with the 
colonization of one rationality by another by means of law, so as to uphold 
society‘s differentiation, in the existing form. However, the question of how 
the conflicting systems and other systems indirectly involved in the dispute 
(notably law, but also politics and science) perceive each other and, in a 
process of co-evolution, reorient their operations and structures to the 
changed environmental demands (or else reject reorientation) is barely 
addressed. The same applies to the question of the role the law is to play in 
this process of co-evolution.  In short, the concept so sensitively developed 
by Teubner, concentrated on maintaining the differentiated systems in 
polycontextural society, needs to be supplemented by a concept of co-
evolution specific to the law. 
Turning now to the irritations proceeding from Post v. VgT, we may see 
in them possibilities of softer ways for the law to deal with social norms. A 
reading of the judges‘ considerations arouses the impression that the 
Federal Court was concerned with updating the civil constitutional function 
of contract law more through selective protection of certain systemic 
mechanisms than by allowing across-the-board system protection. Bearing 
in mind the insights the analysis of the theories of horizontal effect, 
negative freedoms, and discursive rights has brought us, the question that 
next arises is whether the Federal Court‘s procedure [p. 253] can be 
explained on a basis of evolutionary jurisprudence and rendered into the 
form of a technical legal concept. 
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V. CIVIL CONSTITUTION III: STRUCTURAL COUPLING AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF LEGAL DISCOURSES 
A.  Evolutionary Jurisprudence and the Reflexivity of Civil 
Constitutionalism 
Evolutionary Jurisprudence is a recent research approach in legal 
scholarship, starting from the point that the law cannot be the creation of 
one human mind, however brilliant.
68
 It sees denial of this fact as the most 
fatal error of contemporary legal scholarship. Its concern is to show that one 
can do without a deliberately planned design of law and, nevertheless, 
explain how nothing in the world of law happens arbitrarily. This non-
arbitrariness does not—as in classical legal approaches—come about 
because law rests on eternal values (such as God, justice, or efficiency). 
Instead, it is guaranteed by the fact that law stands in a conditional 
equilibrium with society, so that there is a sort of homeostasis between 
them. In other words, this fragile and demanding relationship between law 
and society depends on society‘s capacity to evolve. Accordingly, the law‘s 
rules must be designed to fit this principle of laisser-faire for evolution. 
This proposition is of course paradoxical. Certainly, law is the design of 
society; to that extent, it might very well be seen as the counterpart to 
evolution. However, and this is the source of the paradox, this counterpart is 
itself also evolution. For evolution is omnipresent and ubiquitous! The 
attempt to resolve the paradox should thus be made by seeking to illuminate 
the basic rules of evolutionary jurisprudence mentioned through a 
comparison with the procedure of animal breeders. Just as they play with 
evolutionary mechanisms while in no way obstructing, but rather 
exploiting, them on the basis of relevant accumulated experience—
―selecting selection,‖ one might say—so too does evolutionary 
jurisprudence play with the mechanisms of societal evolution  with the aim, 
as we said, of replacing [p. 254] the undiscoverable, yet in the praxis of law 
taken for granted, ―supreme canon‖ of law ( ―God,‖ etc.) by the mechanism 
of ―social homeostasis.‖ 
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An evolutionary interpretation of Post v. VgT has to start by asking 
what social task the constitutionalization of the law of contract is seeking to 
accomplish. We showed earlier that this task is the integration of 
polycontextural society.
69
 The divergent social discourses of civil society, 
continually evolving, always changing, emerging again in new forms, and 
gradually disappearing or being replaced by new sorts of discourses, are to 
be given an order able to ensure practical concordance between them. This 
sort of order must inevitably be autological, i.e., set up self-referentially, 
since no legislator can foresee the development of an evolving 
polycontextural society and correspondingly lay down an appropriate order. 
It follows that civil constitutionalism is to be understood as a corpus of 
rules that do not authoritatively lay down a particular order, but utilize the 
reflexive potential of the social areas concerned so as to achieve the goal 
pursued, namely social integration through self-created order.
70
 
B.  Structural Coupling as Evolutionary Mechanism 
Against the background of these connections, it must be asked: how is 
it conceivable that individual social areas (e.g., the economy or art) can 
adjust to each other, that is, integrate socially, and thus mitigate or avoid 
potential or actual conflicts? If these social areas are understood in a 
communicative sense, and thus grasped as systems in the sense of modern 
systems theory, then one possible answer is that social integration comes 
about through the mechanism of structural coupling. This answer in turn 
poses a number of hard questions. They are hard particularly because the 
concept of structural coupling holds a central place in systems theory. It is 
the only way for the ―environment to influence a system,‖71 so behind it lies 
the riddle of how social systems develop mutually suited structures and 
ensure the cohesion of society. But what exactly is to be understood by the 
term structural coupling? 
Ultimately, it denotes a system‘s adaptation to its environment; for 
instance, with living creatures, the fact that their muscles are coordinated 
with the force of gravity on Earth to enable their movements on land, in 
water, or in the air, which are requirements for their survival, or that 
creatures with eyes and ears can, to- [p. 255] gether with their brains, grasp 
some narrow physical bandwidth of their environment so as to orient their 
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operations to it.
72
 These examples show that restrictions on structural 
coupling have drastic consequences for a system. Such restrictions may 
affect the conditions for it to be able to adapt its specific way of operating, 
that is, its autonomy (or in systems-theory jargon, its autopoiesis) in its 
environment.
73
 For the system itself, accordingly, structural coupling means 
an ―area‖ in which ―opportunities [are] stored, which the system can use, 
can convert into information.‖74 The term structural coupling first of all 
denotes ―a system‘s relation to the environmental requirements that … have 
to be met, have to be given, to be able to continue its autopoiesis.‖75 By 
contrast, operative couplings—as a counter-concept—merely synchronize 
operations with each other, i.e., are not lastingly oriented to the existence of 
particular structures in the environment, but merely link up momentarily to 
other operations for one event only.
76
 
But this is only one side of the coin. The description of structural 
coupling as a system‘s existential relation to its environment also suggests 
that this relation contains the conditions for the system to act 
environmentally compatibly, i.e., to integrate socially. For if Luhmann uses 
the term structural coupling to denote the fact that a system continually 
presumes particular features of its environment and structurally relies on 
them,
77
 he simultaneously implies that the system reflects the consequences 
of its behavior for the environment and is, to that extent, aware of the 
importance of the environment‘s integrity for its own autopoiesis. By 
linking its operations to the structural coupling, the system limits its internal 
excesses of capacity and thus tolerates restriction of its freedom.
78
 Since 
structural coupling means both the system‘s capacity to deal with its 
environment and its dependency on that environment, we can see that this 
mechanism is the relay station for the integration of the system (for 
example, law, politics, the economy, art, or religion) into the overall system 
(society). 
Therefore, it is essential for sociology to understand this mechanism 
better—specifically, to decipher its existential and functional conditions. 
However, on this very point there are not inconsiderable differences of 
opinion among scholars. Ac- [p. 256] cording to a basic rule of systems 
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theory, it is the social system‘s structures (not environmental influences) 
that determine its evolution. Luhmann, therefore, rejects ―any notion of 
explaining the evolution of social systems that contains any tendency, of 
whatever nature, for social systems to adapt to their environment.‖79 
Accordingly, structural coupling could not be explained as a consequence 
of evolution. Luhmann states in this regard:  
for it [the theory of autopoietic systems], adaptedness is a 
precondition, not an outcome, of evolution; and an 
outcome, if at all, only in the sense that evolution destroys 
its material if it can no longer guarantee adaptedness. The 
burden of explanation is now borne by the concept of 
―structural coupling.‖ For structural coupling has always 
guaranteed adaptation adequate for the continuation of 
autopoiesis.
80
  
Aschke has raised significant objections to this view. Essentially, he 
sees it as rooted in theory-structure constraints on systems theory. He 
argues that Luhmann, with his thesis that structural coupling is not a 
consequence but a precondition of evolution, is concerned only with 
harmonizing evolutionary theory with his theory of autopoietic systems. 
The price for this harmonization is the exclusion of all external value 
parameters, which are dependent on the environment and which are needed 
for the differential reproduction of the social system. This in turn has the 
consequence that structural couplings cannot convincingly be explained as 
an outcome of evolution.
81
 That Luhmann dismisses the whole issue with 
the remark, ―The determination of a beginning, an origin, a ‗source‘ and a 
‗before‘ (or none) ... is a myth generated in the system itself – or a tale by 
another observer,‖82 is regarded by Aschke as a pis aller.83 
Perhaps Aschke‘s dismissive attitude, though correctly putting a finger 
on a vulnerable point in Luhmann‘s theory, is, after all, too hasty. We 
believe that Luhmann‘s thesis of structural coupling as a precondition for 
evolution does point in the right direction, as long as one is prepared to 
reassess the thesis in light of [p. 257] more recent findings of evolutionary 
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theory. What we have in mind is the work of Kauffman, who, in years of 
experimentation with complex gene systems, developed a theory to which 
we can make recourse here.
84
 Very briefly, the theory consists of the 
following three propositions: (1) by contrast with the hitherto dominant 
Darwinian version, evolution does not have a single central agency, but 
rather two, namely selection and spontaneous organization; (2) selection 
presupposes spontaneous organization, or, in other words, the selection 
mechanism works only as long as the evolving system possesses the 
capacity to organize itself spontaneously; and (3) this capacity for 
spontaneous organization depends on a particular internal set of relations of 
the system‘s elements, which enables it to absorb perturbations from its 
environment in such a way as not to endanger its operational capacity (that 
is, its autopoiesis).
85
 
This theory has many implications for evolutionary theory, which 
cannot all be explored here. The most important thing is simply that it 
suggests revising our understanding of the selection function—its role is not 
to structure the evolving system in such a way that it adapts to its 
environment, but rather, like a sort of search engine, to guide the (already 
adapted) system to where its evolutionary prospects can be improved. Even 
if at first sight the difference may seem slight, it has one significant 
consequence: the process of evolution does not constitute an 
environmentally steered unfolding of the properties of the evolving system. 
Instead, evolution is only possible because, from the outset, a logic is 
present in the system that ensures its capacity for evolution. The conclusion 
to be drawn is that structural coupling comes about in the evolutionary 
factor of spontaneous formation of order. That is, it is directly associated 
with the system‘s capacity for spontaneous (self-) organization shown by 
Kauffman. 
CONCLUSION 
This reconstruction of the concept of structural coupling enables an 
interpretation of the civil constitutionalism by way of the law of contract 
envisaged by the Federal Court in Post v. VgT in terms of legal evolution. 
The Federal Court has intervened in the system of society as a whole at the 
very place where the sub-areas of society supplement and mutually support 
each other: the locus of their structural couplings. More specifically, in the 
Post v. VgT judgment, the Federal [p. 258] Court did not set the political 
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discourse entirely above the economy, but confined itself to upholding, 
through the means of the obligation to contract, the link between the 
societal sectors on which politics structurally relies and is dependent for its 
autopoiesis. 
The resemblance to the concept of discursive rights cannot be 
overlooked. However, while the theory of discursive rights starts from the 
endangerment of one discourse by another (as in the example of family 
surety described) and works across the board in systems-theory terms 
(through nullity of the surety),
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 it is enough, following the evolutionary-
theory concept favored here, for the law to concentrate on the strategic 
points in the network of societal communication, that is, on the structural 
couplings. A systems-theory reading of Post v. VgT points in this direction. 
The Federal Court went step by step in this judgment and—one might say 
in wise judicial self-restraint—confined itself to a soberly realistic 
protection of the evolutionary capacity of the politics discourse. This 
procedure is wise especially because it does justice to the nature of a 
polycontextural society. If it is true that this type of society is typified by 
permanence-oriented change of its components, the social discourses, then 
it would be contradictory to impose on the discourse of law the task of 
integrating diverging discourses, which have become just as foreign to each 
other as to the law, in authoritative fashion. 
Behind the civil constitutionalism of the Federal Court‘s judgment lies 
yet more, namely a subtlety that becomes properly visible only through the 
lens of evolutionary jurisprudence. It does not try to restore structural 
coupling between the economy and politics—as the relation between social 
systems upon which social cohesion rests—through the obligation to 
contract. Instead, it only (but importantly) gives judicial support to an 
already existing structural coupling between the economic and politics 
discourses. It thereby upholds the possibility of social integration and does 
so only to the extent that the politics system relies structurally on the 
economy. 
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